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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examined the investigation of tender irregularities within the City of Tshwane 
Metropolitan Municipality (CoT) and employed semi-structured interviews with 
investigators attached to the CoT Group Audit and Risk (GAR) Division within the 
Protection Service to obtain data. A literature study relating to aspects of tender 
irregularities and the investigation of non-compliance was conducted. From the results 
of this research, it appears that participants do not optimally investigate the non-
compliance of tender procedures by service providers to reduce tender irregularities 
within the CoT. However, it is apparent that participants experience challenges to 
efficiently investigate the non-compliance of tender procedures by service providers 
within the CoT to reduce tender irregularities. The study makes recommendations that 
could assist investigators at the CoT GAR Division to enhance their investigations of the 
non-compliance of tender procedures by service providers. 
 
Key terms 
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procedures; procurement; investigator; service providers;  City of Tshwane Metropolitan 
Municipality.  
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL ORIENTATION AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY     
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Various policies govern Supply Chain Management (SCM) in government 
departments. However, responsible officials do not always adhere to the guidelines 
outlined in these policies Matthee (2006:12). Van Zyl (2006:43) indicates that these 
guidelines are sometimes circumvented because there are no adequate bid 
committees, suppliers used are not qualified, bids are disregarded for the wrong 
reasons, the wrong procurement process is used with regard to the threshold, validity 
periods are not enforced and the bidding process is not used in the correct way.  
Members of the society pay for the price of irregular tender processes within local 
governments. Procedures for local government tender processes are enshrined 
unequivocally in relevant legal provisions. However, one has lost count of how many 
times local government officials deviate from tender compliance procedures.  
 
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
It is the responsibility of the accounting officers employed by the CoT to make sure 
that the acquisition process is complied with in their departments as prescribed in the 
Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), No. 29 of 1999 (South Africa, 1999); 
Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA), No. 56 of 2003 (South Africa, 2003); 
Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act (PPPFA) (South Africa, 2000b); 
Treasury Regulations; and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(South Africa, 1996). Section 38 (iii) of the PFMA 1 of 1999 stipulates that the 
“accounting officer must ensure that the department, trading entity or constitutional 
institution has and maintains: an appropriate procurement and provisioning system 
which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost effective”.   
 
1.2.1 Role of City of Tshwane Supply Chain Management  
 
 The SCM unit of the CoT must develop, coordinate, operate and keep the SCM 
policy and procedures in order to ensure that all acquisition is done with the said 
policy and procedures. The SCM unit should keep and continuously update the 
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supplier database and manage and run all the parallel contracts of which the 
National Treasury (NT) is the holder (City of Tshwane, 2011). 
 
1.2.2 Procurement Process at City of Tshwane 
 
“Clause 8.3 of the CoT SCM Policy Amendment Report (City of Tshwane, 2011) that 
was approved on 27 September 2007 and amended on 24 February 2011 prescribes 
the following procurement process”: 
 
Value of 
Purchase 
(Value Added Tax 
(VAT) inclusive) 
Procurement method Delegated 
authority 
Oversigh
t role 
R2001 up to R10 
000 
Quotations  Deputy Director 
Acquisitions in 
consultation with 
the relevant 
departments 
Director 
Acquisitio
ns 
R10 001 up to R30 
000 
Three quotations – one formal 
and written and two others. 
These should comply with the 
procurement framework of the 
CoT 
Director 
acquisition in 
consultation with 
the relevant 
departments 
Executive 
Director 
SCM 
R30 001 up to   
R200 000 
Formal written price quotation 
must comply with the MFMA, 
must be sealed and placed in a 
box. Advertisements must run 
on notice boards as well as 
feature on the municipality’s 
website for seven days. 
Thereafter, points must be 
allocated in terms of the points 
system. 
Strategic 
Executive 
Director in 
consultation with 
Director 
Acquisitions and 
ED SCM 
Executive 
Director 
SCM and 
Chief 
Financial 
Officer 
(CFO) 
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Tenders from 
above R200 000 
up to R10 million 
and long term 
contracts 
A competitive bidding process. 
Advertisements to run on 
notice boards for 14 days or 
longer as well as feature on 
the website of the CoT.  
Advertisements to be placed in 
local newspapers and others 
for 14 days or longer. 
Points allocated in terms of the 
points system. 
Bid Adjudication 
Committee (BAC) 
City Manager 
Tenders above 
R10 million 
A complete bidding process. 
Advertisements to be placed 
on notice boards for 30 days or 
longer.  
Advertisements to run in local 
newspapers and more for 30 
days or longer 
Points allocated in terms of the 
preferential points system. 
Accounting officer 
on 
recommendation 
from adjudication 
committee above 
R10 million 
City Manager 
  
1.2.3 City of Tshwane Forensic and Investigation Services Division 
 
The internal GAR Division perform the investigation of tender irregularities within the 
CoT. The Forensic Investigation Services (FIS) is a division of the GAR. The FIS is 
mandated to investigate all allegations of tender non-compliance, fraud, including 
procurement fraud and corruption within the CoT (City of Tshwane, 2013a:1). In terms 
of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (PRECCA), No. 12 of 2004 
(South Africa, 2004a) all corrupt activities must be brought to the attention of the 
relevant authorities and offenders should be brought to account. 
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1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Formulating the research problem is the most vital part a research project. Without a 
sound description of the problem, the research project will be an ‘unguided missile’, 
one has no idea which direction it will take Verhoeven (2011:79). According to Leedy 
and Ormrod (2010:48), researchers get off to a strong start when they begin an 
unmistakable clear statement of the problem.  According to Badenhorst (2010:19), the 
problem statement is a well-defined statement that briefly gives the research problem. 
In contrast, Bless, Higson-Smith and Kagee (2006:29) describe a research problem 
as a broad consideration of the correlation between two or more variables. 
 
Between January 2010 and January 2011, the public sector suffered financial 
misconduct amounting to R932 million between January 2011 and January 2012 an 
amount of R1 billion was lost through financial irregularities (Corruption Watch Annual 
Report, 2013: 1). For the period January 2012 to January 2014, Corruption Watch 
received 465 reports related to procurement irregularities (Corruption Watch Annual 
Report, 2013: 1). A clear standing policy framework that guides the manner in which 
tenders should be procured exists within all local governments, including the CoT. 
However, Matthee (2006:56) suggests that a number of procurement personnel in 
conjunction with tender bidders are not adhering to tender compliance procedures as 
stipulated in the policy framework.  
 
This study examined the investigation of tender irregularities within the CoT. According 
to the 2013 Audit Report of the Auditor-General to the Gauteng Provincial Legislature 
and the CoT (City of Tshwane, 2013b:4) the following irregularities regarding tender 
procedures were discovered:  
 
• The CoT awarded contracts and quotes to bidders who gave no declaration of 
their possible employment by the state or having relations with somebody who 
is in the employ of the state as required by National Treasury’s Municipal Supply 
Chain Management regulation 13(c) CoT (City of Tshwane, 2013a:4).  
• Contrary to section 112(j) of the MFMA (South Africa, 2003) and SCM regulation 
44, tenders were awarded to service providers who are employed by the CoT 
(City of Tshwane, 2013b:4).  
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• Furthermore, service providers also did not submit information regarding their 
possible employment by the CoT as required by SCM regulation 13(c) and 
regulation 46(2) (e) and the Code of Conduct for staff members issued in terms 
of Municipal System Act, No. 32 of 2000 (South Africa, 2000a).  
 
The CoT is a direct contact between the State and citizens. However, if citizens are 
denied access to quality service delivery because of non-compliance with tender 
procedures that lead to tender irregularities, then the government has failed its people. 
According to the Report of the Auditor General (AG) to the Gauteng Legislature and 
the SCM policy CoT (City of Tshwane, 2013c:5), from a forensic investigation that was 
done, there were allegations that irregularities took place in tender processes during 
procurement. It was found that, in some cases, quotations were divided in order to 
arrive at a lower amount and in this way circumvent section 12(3) of the MFMA 56 of 
2003 (South Africa, 2003) and SCM policy CoT (City of Tshwane, 2013a:5 ). The way 
in which the CoT appointed suppliers by making use of financial and legal advisors is 
being examined. This investigation was still ongoing during this research. According 
to the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) (2012:27), the service provider of the CoT 
submitted invoices when no services were rendered for the Home of Jazz Music 
Festival. 
 
The problem under investigation focuses on the investigation of tender irregularities 
within CoT. However, compounding the problem is the fact that investigators within the 
CoT are not acquainted with legal provisions regulating tender procurement at 
municipal level. According to the CoT Economic Development Agency (City of 
Tshwane, 2010:4) SCM regulations were not always followed when goods and 
services were procured. Consequently, tender processes were not adhered to and 
record-keeping pertaining to performance information was not adequate. Despite all 
these tender irregularities, sufficient actions were not taken in all instances to ensure 
that proper management is performed regarding finances and performance. During 
preliminary interviews conducted with investigators at CoT and perusal of investigation 
dockets, it was found that fraud, corruption, tender-rigging, kickbacks, and irregular 
appointments are rife at CoT. 
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1.4 RESEARCH AIM 
 
According to Mouton and Marais (1996:103), research has as its goal to find facts and 
new data. The research should also seek to find if patterns are visible in the data. The 
research aim generally implies an articulation of what the researcher is planning to do 
and what you hope to achieve Bak (2011:16).  
 
This study aimed to examine the investigation of tender irregularities within the CoT.  
 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
All research begins with the identification of a research question (Noaks & Wincup, 
2004:122). According to Willig (2009:20), most qualitative research projects are guided 
by one or more questions. Wood, Giles and Percy (2012:45) define a research 
question as a question that the one to which an answer is currently unknown but which 
can be addressed by a well-designed piece of research. The following research 
question was formulated for this research: 
 Do investigators efficiently investigate the non-compliance of tender procedures 
by service providers to reduce tender irregularities within the CoT? 
 
1.6 PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH  
 
The purpose of the research is the key conceptual paragraph that frames and guides 
the research Badenhorst (2010:12). According to Babbie, Mouton, Vorster, and 
Prozesky (2011:79), three of the most common purposes of research are exploration, 
description and explanation. The purpose of this study was:  
 To study the investigation procedures in tender irregularities within the CoT and 
describe them. 
 To underline non-compliance of tender processes within the CoT and to 
highlight the financial implications thereof. 
 To determine the extent to which compliance procedures are followed during 
tender bidding and the degree to which preventative measures to prevent 
irregularities are applied. 
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 To empower the investigators in the CoT division GAR as well as the 
investigators within CoT Protection Services Internal Unit with the findings 
acquired during the research. 
 
1.7 DEMARCATION OF THE STUDY 
 
The Internal Investigation Unit within CoT Metropolitan Police and the CoT GAR within 
the CoT Protection Service were the main emphasis of the study. It consists of only 11 
members who are mandated to investigate corruption, fraud as well as non-
compliance of tender regulations by suppliers within the CoT. The GAR division 
consists of 25 investigators. 
 
1.8 KEY THEORETICAL CONCEPTS 
 
Conceptualisation is the process of specifying what one means by a term (Bachmann, 
Russel & Schutt, 2003:64) definitions that describe concepts by using other concepts 
are conceptual definitions (Welman, Kruger & Mitchell, 2005:20). The following 
concepts are central to this study and, therefore, warrant clarification: 
 
1.8.1 Fraud 
 
According to Birzer and Roberson (2012:200), fraud is a broad term to indicate that 
one individual has gained an advantage over another by cunningly using one or more 
of a variety of possible means to falsely represent goods or information. Fraud is 
defined by Hopwood, Leiner and Young (2012:11) as when a person gains a benefit 
above others by means of untruths and false proposals. 
 
1.8.2 Corrupt Practice 
 
A practice is corrupt when an official in the public service is implored or otherwise 
offered or given anything in order to sway the process of procuring or to unlawfully 
obtain a contract (South Africa, 2010:17).  
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1.8.3 Tender 
 
According to the PPPFA, 5 of 2000 (South Africa, 2000b), a tender is an offer that is 
made formally and in writing on a specified form. This offer is made, together with price 
quotations and competitive tendering processes or proposals, to a state organ. 
 
1.8.4 Corruption 
 
Corruption is when a person receives or gives personal benefit to somebody in 
exchange for a task performed (Burchell & Milton, 1997: 643). 
 
1.8.5 Bribery 
 
Bribery takes place when a public of legal officer is offered or given a valuable item in 
order to change his/her actions as well as when this person accepts such item. It is 
also a criminal offence to ask for an item(s) as a bribe and is punishable upon the 
request and not upon the fulfilling of such request (Wex Legal Dictionary, 2018).  
 
1.8.6 Favouritism 
 
Favouritism is the unfair practice of giving someone help or advantages that you do 
not give to others (Macmillan Dictionary, 2018).  
1.9 VALUE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
According to Denscombe (2002:43), good research needs to be able to demonstrate 
its relevance. 
 
• Results of the research could be used to enhance existing knowledge and adds 
value to the community of Tshwane and Investigation Unit on how to eliminate 
tender non-compliance irregularities in the CoT. 
  9 
• The study demonstrated how to implement and recommend the research 
problem solving ability, and to add to the body of knowledge in the municipal 
investigation unit and the criminal justice system. 
• The researcher examined compliance procedure in the investigation of tender 
irregularities within a local government municipal. 
• The outcome or the end results of the research could be used to enhance the 
investigators capabilities in examining compliance procedures in the 
investigation of tender irregularities within a local government municipality. 
• The research would benefit the forensic and investigation unit on contributing 
their researched knowledge with regard to curbing non-compliance in tender 
irregularities in the CoT. 
1.10 RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
The researcher followed a qualitative research approach. Bordens and Abbott 
(2014:231) describe qualitative research as written records of observed behaviour that 
a researcher analyses qualitatively. Dunn (2013:397) similarly explains that qualitative 
research relies on participants’ verbal descriptions and analysis of events. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted to gather information from investigators at the 
FIS. The researcher recorded all the participants that were interviewed with an audio 
recorder to capture their remarks and responses that were used in the analysis 
process. 
1.11 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
A research design is a general plan according to which a research strategy will be 
implemented. It specifies the population to be used in the study in terms of using 
groups or individual participants, the way in which assessments will be made, in terms 
of within a group or between groups, and the number of variables that will be included 
in the study Gravetter and Forzano (2012:190). Empirical research was applied where 
participants were interviewed one on one to examine non-compliance of suppliers of 
tendering during their investigations. Furthermore, Gravetter and Forzano (2010:13) 
mention that an empirical method uses observation or direct sensory experience to 
obtain knowledge. Research design sets out the steps the researcher plans to take 
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while doing the research Babbie, et al. (2011:74). A research design is an explanation 
of the way the researcher plans to achieve the answer to the formulated research 
problem (Mouton, 2009:175). 
1.12 TARGET POPULATION AND SAMPLING 
 
According to Dantzker and Hunter (2006:29), a population is the sum total of all the 
participants or class of participants from whom the researcher will collect information. 
For example, police officers, probation officers, and correctional officers are each a 
population. Similarly, Maxfield and Babbie (2008:437) describe a population as all 
people, things, or other elements one wish to represent. The population for this 
research included all the GAR investigators who investigate procurement fraud and 
irregularities of tender non-compliance. Nevertheless, not all investigators will be 
interviewed but a target group thereof.  By population, we mean all the ‘elements’ that 
you will be making statements about in your research (Verhoeven, 2011:175).  
 
According to Bless, Higson-Smith and Kagee (1995:88), non-probability is when it is 
not possible to calculate beforehand what the odds are of an element being included 
in the sample. Researchers rely mostly on purposive sampling because of the 
experience they have or they rely on previous research findings, it is also economical 
in terms of time and financial expenses. 
 
A sample is a smaller part that is selected from the wider target population to represent 
the entire population and give relevant information on what the entire group might be 
like Dantzker and Hunter (2006:29). Investigators that were purposely selected in the 
sample out of all existing investigators were interviewed. Data were collected until 
saturation had been reached. 
1.13 DATA COLLECTION 
 
Data collection takes place when the researcher uses the selected instrument to 
engage with the sample or cases selected for investigation in order to obtain 
information (Mouton, 2009:67). Similarly, Matthews and Ross (2010:43) describe data 
as opinions or values that can be analysed and from which conclusions can be drawn. 
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The data collection methods that were used in this study were a literature review and 
interviews.  
 
1.13.1 Literature Review 
 
Literature review involves perusing published documentation that might be relevant to 
the current research Bless et al. (1995:22). Moreover, the researcher uses every 
material available with regard to tender irregularities. Machi and McEnvoy (2012:4) 
argue that literature review is the written exposition of a case that was argued rationally 
based on an all-inclusive knowledge of a topic. Matthews and Ross (2010:105) 
describe literature review as the expansion and detailed study of initial ideas by means 
of existing literature, such as literature review.  
 
1.13.2 Interviews  
 
According to Bless et al. (1995:106), an interview involves a situation where the 
participants are communicating directly with each other in order to obtain answers to 
questions asked. The researcher conducted semi-structured interviews, and the 
participants expressed themselves with regard to the investigation of tender 
irregularities. In the same vein, Matthews and Ross (2010:219) concur that an 
interview is a particular type of conversation between two or more people. The 
researcher conducted semi-structured interviews with members attached to the CoT 
GAR within the CoT Protection Service since it allowed participants to provide in-depth 
information of their personal experiences of the non-compliance of tender procedures 
by service providers in the investigation of tender irregularities within the CoT. 
 
1.14 DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Data entail the observations collected in the course of a project Dunn (2013:389). 
Analysis is a process of working with the data to describe, discuss, interpret, evaluate, 
and explain the data in terms of the research questions or of the research project 
Matthews and Ross (2010:317). Data analysis is done when the current data are 
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compared to information already published in reports on the same topic. Most 
importantly, the field notes can be questioned and reviewed in the light of any new 
information found (Welman, Kruger & Mitchell, 2011:212). The researcher followed a 
thematic analysis method as explained by Braun and Clarke (in Gray, 2014:609).  
 
The researcher analysed the data by following the six phases explained by Braun and 
Clarke: 
 
Phase 1:  She became acquainted with the data, transcribed some necessary data 
and wrote down initial ideas. 
Phase 2:  The researcher systematically created codes to be used for the data. 
Phase 3: She then identified and created themes. By doing this, the researcher 
grouped the data into the different themes. 
Phase 4:  After this, the researcher evaluated the selected themes for validity against 
the data sets. 
Phase 5:  When the evaluation of the themes was done, they were described and 
given names in terms of their scope and content. 
Phase 6:  The last phase was the production of the report. The themes identified had 
to be corroborated with evidence.  
1.15 METHODS TO ENSURE VALIDITY 
 
Validity relates to whether an instrument is measuring what is supposed to measure 
(Dunn, 2013:399). Validity refers to whether or not an experiment explains what it 
claims, in other words, the truth of the causality, which is inferred (Breakwell, 
Hammond, Fife-Schaw & Smith, 2006:73). Furthermore, validity is defined as the 
ability of your measurement to accurately measure what is supposed to measure 
(Raacke & Raacke, 2012:84). The interview schedule measured what it was supposed 
to measure because it adhered to the aims, purpose and research question of the 
study. The interviews were consistent since investigators were asked the same 
questions.  
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1.16 METHODS TO ENSURE RELIABILITY 
 
Reliability is when the measure renders the same results when used in other 
occasions. Therefore, reliability is primarily concerned with being able to replicate or 
produce the findings (Raacke & Raacke, 2012:82). In order to adequately test for 
reliability, the research must be replicable (Verhoeven, 2011:184). If research findings 
are similar with research conducted elsewhere, then it is regarded as reliable. Data 
were collected through a literature review and semi-structured interviews. Data 
collection methods could be regarded as reliable since it is related to the topic in 
question and it can be replicable. Reliable literature related to the research question 
was used, such as academic journals and books. 
  
1.17 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Research ethics involves the researcher to handle all individuals affected by the results 
of their research study or results honestly and with respect (Gravetter & Forzano, 
2010:72). Plagiarism takes place when one person presents the work or ideas of 
another person under the premise of it being his/her own work or ideas. This is a highly 
unethical practice (Gravetter & Forzano, 2010:96). The researcher focused on the 
following ethical considerations: 
 
1.17.1  Informed Consent 
 
When research involves public documents or records that human beings have 
previously created, such as birth certificates, newspaper articles and so on, such 
documents and records are generally considered to be freely available for use by 
researchers. However, when a researcher purposefully sought specific individuals to 
take part in a research study, he should inform them of the nature, aim and purpose of 
the study to enable them to decide whether they want to participate based on these 
facts. They should also be told that they are not obliged to participate and can withdraw 
their participation whenever they feel they want to (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010:101). 
Accordingly, the researcher adhered to Leedy and Ormrod’s (2010:101) instruction 
and obtained prior informed consent from participants.  
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1.17.2  Anonymity and Confidentiality 
 
In order to further scientific progress, people are willing to share private information 
provided their name is not revealed. This may be the case where employees are asked 
to reveal information about their employer or their working conditions. Another 
example is where a person has to reveal his own or another person’s addiction to 
drugs (Bless et al., 1995:103). The information obtained from participants was kept 
confidential and has not been made available to anyone other than the researcher. 
Participants’ anonymity was also ensured by not divulging any identifiable information 
that could be traced back to them. 
 
1.17.3  Voluntary Participation 
 
Voluntariness is what study participation should be built upon (Leedy & Ormrod, 
2010:101). Participants were informed that participation in this study was strictly 
voluntary with no penalty for non-participation. In addition, participants were also given 
the choice to end their participation in the study whenever they want to without having 
to motivate why. 
 
1.17.4  Protection from harm 
 
The researcher did not expose research participants to unnecessary physical, 
emotional or psychological harm as advocated by Leedy and Ormrod (2010:101). 
 
1.18 SUMMARY 
 
The chapter presented the methodology adopted by the researcher as a plan or 
blueprint in addressing the research question. Over and above, the chapter looked into 
how data was collected, analysed and reported while following scientific research 
paradigm to address the problem under investigation. The chapter served as a 
skeleton in which data must be collected and fed into while guided by research 
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etiquette and the need to explore literature on compliance procedure in the 
investigation of tender irregularities. It was also in this chapter where the researcher 
projected how to deal with ethical issues affected by the research topic and research 
questions.  
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CHAPTER 2: TENDER IRREGULARITIES AND THE INVESTIGATION OF NON-
COMPLIANCE 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The prevalence of fraud and corruption because of tender irregularities in South Africa 
undermines good public service delivery. The lack of skills and expertise within all 
levels of government in South Africa results in many services having to be sourced 
from private owned organisations.  According to section 217 (1) of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 (South Africa, 1996), when a state entity 
at any level of government or any institution indicated in national legislation enters into 
a contract to obtain goods or services, it must adhere to a system which is fair, 
equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective.  
 
International organisations, such as the World Bank (WB) and United Nations (UN), 
which South Africa is signatory, have over a decade ago emphasised the importance 
of quality governance and sound institutions from a developmental perspective 
(Rothstein, 2011:34). Despite the fact that processes for improvement are used when 
procuring in the public arena and when using the Supply Chain Management tool, 
there are still predicaments in South African public procurement practices (Ambe & 
Badenhorst-Weiss, 2012:243). This chapter looks into legislations and policy-
frameworks guiding the awarding of tender in government more particularly at local 
government. This chapter discusses the policy framework regarding procurement 
within the CoT as well as legislation governing the awarding of tenders. 
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2.2  OVERVIEW OF THE LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
GOVERNING TENDER PROCEDURES WITHIN THE CITY OF TSHWANE 
 
The following discussion focuses on legislation and policies governing tender 
procedures within the CoT.  
 
2.2.1 The City of Tshwane Supply Chain Management Policy Amendment 
Report 
 
Themeli (2017:2) summarises the CoT procurement process as follows: 
Clause 8.3 of the CoT Supply Chain Management Policy Amendment Report (City of 
Tshwane, 2011) prescribes that the following procedures be followed when procuring 
goods and services: 
 
• R0 up to R2000 should be procured through petty cash.  
• R2001 up to R10 000 should be procured through quotations. 
• R10 001 up to R30 000 should be procured through one formal written and two 
other price quotations in accordance with council approved procurement 
framework. 
• R30 001 up to R200 000 should be procured through three formal written price 
quotations. 
 
All procurement should comply with the MFMA, 2003, Act No. 56 of 2003 (South Africa, 
2003), should be sealed and placed in the box, should be publicised on notice boards 
and on the website of the municipality for seven days. After all this has been complied 
with, points should be allocated in terms of the points system. However, tenders of 
R200 001 up to 10 million as well as long-term contracts should be subject to a 
competitive bidding process which includes publication of the tender and the 
municipality’s website and in a local newspaper for 14 days or longer After this, the 
tender should be adjudicated in terms of the points system, except for tenders of more 
than R10 million which should be dealt with in accordance with a competitive bidding 
process. This means that it should be published on a notice board, the municipality’s 
website and in a local newspaper for 30 days or longer and then dealt with in terms of 
the preferential points system.  
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The CoT Supply Chain Management Policy Amendment Report specifically pays 
attention to the required procedures that service providers should follow to procure 
goods and services. The stipulations of this Report further prescribe how tenders 
allocated for goods and services should be awarded according to the value of the 
purchase. 
 
According to Mantzaris (2014:70) there are some steps to be followed while inviting 
and adjudicating a tender which are all connected to each other. These steps start with 
doing a needs analysis, planning the process, defining the requirements and 
specifications, and selecting the processes and methods to be used. After this, a 
supplier is sought by means of setting predetermined requirements, publishing a 
request for tenders, receiving tenders, evaluating the tenders received, and then 
awarding them. After the tenders have been awarded, the contracts are managed and 
monitored, orders are placed and payments are made on time. Stock and Lambert 
(2009: 29) emphasise that it is very important to keep to the rules during tendering, for 
instance by keeping everything regarding the bids received completely confidential 
until the opening of the bids. Upon opening the bids, all bidders should be allowed to 
view all other bids submitted. If the bid requires more that only the best price, it should 
be clearly stipulated before evaluation starts. It should be ensured that the evaluators 
are competent in the particular field to do a quick and proper assessment of the bids, 
and that they make the results known as soon as the evaluation is complete. 
 
In order to ensure that a possible supplier of goods and services is credible, several 
steps should be followed, as follows: vetting of suppliers; verifying suppliers’ actual 
existence, registration and date of registration; determining suppliers’ value-added tax 
(VAT) status; checking on suppliers’ business history; establishing who the 
directors/members are; considering their credit history; doing a search for civil and 
criminal judgements. Moreover, their Previously Disadvantaged Individuals (PDI) and 
Employment Equity (EE) status should be examined and they should be required to 
sign the code of conduct of the customer; entering into an integrity pact between the 
customer and the bidding company; introducing greater flexibility with regard to 
dialogue between purchasers and suppliers; encouraging the use of modern 
information and communications technologies; using negotiation only in exceptional 
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circumstances. Furthermore, supply offers should be evaluated against recognised 
technical specifications (application of International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) 9000); considering the economic and financial feasibility of the supplier and its 
technical abilities and experience in making selections; and using benchmarking to 
compare the costs and methods of industrial and consumer products (Woods & 
Mantzaris, 2012:129). Mantzaris (2014: 72) further explains where the tender was for 
services to be rendered, comparisons in the case of services, comparisons should be 
made with similar functions, even in other industries. In this way the procurement 
process can be finalised quickly and transaction costs reduced considerably. 
 
When procurement is done, adequate internal controls are needed to ensure that no 
irregularities take place, because monitoring and evaluation of procurement 
procedures are an integral part of the management of an organisation which ensure 
integrity and compliance with laws and ethical standards. Management should give 
much attention to ensuring that the procurement process and procedures comply with 
accountability and transparency and do not fall prey to fraud and corruption (Mantzaris, 
2014: 76). Some vitally important steps in the procurement process ensure that 
corruption does not take place. These are: the internal controls must be distinguished 
as well as an evaluation of their proper operation, and then chances of these controls 
being ignored must be removed. Key internal controls that should be assessed include 
segregation of duties, supervisory controls, receiving controls, authorisation controls, 
and recording controls (Heggstad, Frøystad & Isaksen, 2010:4). 
 
Participants were asked the following question: According to you, what procedures 
should be followed to procure goods and services as stated in the CoT Supply Chain 
Management Policy according to the value of the services or goods rendered? The 
purpose of this question was to assess the participants’ familiarity with the required 
procedures the CoT should follow to procure goods or services. A summary of the 
participants’ responses follows:    
 
• Four participants believed that, depending on the value of the financial value of 
the tender, tender should be advertised in the accessible media platform inviting 
competent bidders with reasonable quotation to provide services or goods. 
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• Two participants stated that tender boxes are placed at CoT procurement 
offices and the bidders deposit their tender documents in the boxes.  
• Five participants mentioned that all bidders are provided equal opportunity if 
they meet all tender requirements.  
• Two participants indicated that tenders which amounts to between R30 001 and 
R200 000, are procured by means of comparing prices given by potential 
suppliers of goods or services and lowest price is normally chosen.  
• Two participants believed that the winner of the tender is publicly announced 
after the selection criteria have been followed.  
• One participant is of the opinion that, if need be, other bidders who lost out are 
allowed opportunity to launch grievance against the final decision. 
 
Based on the feedback from the participants, there is a desperate need for the 
investigators to acquaint themselves with procurement policies and laws regulating 
procurement of goods and services. That would strengthen their investigation of 
tender-irregularities and save them against any civil claim that might arise because of 
their investigation. Limited knowledge expressed by the participants stems from 
investigators and legal practitioners not cooperating with each other. 
 
2.2.2 Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 
 
Section 175 of the MFMA 56 of 2003 (South Africa, 2003) gives Minister of Finance 
the power to make regulations of dealings with financial misconduct and related 
matters. The aforementioned section further stipulates that each municipality must 
establish reporting procedures to ensure that people can report allegations of financial 
misconduct without their identity being made known. 
 
Section 175 of the MFMA 56 of 2003 (South Africa, 2003) further stipulates that upon 
the receipt of allegations of financial misconduct, they must be probed by the municipal 
entity’s disciplinary board to verify whether they are founded. Thereafter, the board 
should make a recommendation to the council or board of directors on its finding 
regarding whether the allegations are founded and whether there are sufficient 
grounds to investigate the allegations. 
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When an allegation as discussed above is referred to a disciplinary board or an 
external investigator or investigative team in terms of regulation 6(5) of Municipal 
Council for investigation, the investigating person or entity must develop terms of 
references for the investigation, which should be approved by the council or the board 
of directors. 
 
Section 175 of the MFMA 56 of 2003 (South Africa, 2003), stipulates that, when an 
investigation is complete, the disciplinary board or independent investigator must write 
the investigation report and submit it to the mayoral committee and accounting officer 
or chairperson of the board of directors as well as a copy to the provincial and national 
treasury.  
 
The MFMA 56 of 2003 (South Africa, 2003), particularly stipulates that regulations of 
dealing with financial misconduct and related matters should be established at 
municipalities. The stipulations of the MFMA further prescribe procedures that 
municipalities should follow to ensure that persons can possible financial misconduct 
confidentially as well as the investigative procedures that should follow. 
 
2.2.3 Public Administration and Management Act 11 of 2014 
  
It is common in South Africa that business people are appointed in senior positions 
while their businesses are providing services to government. They are by law required 
to disclose any conflict of interest up resuming the term of office. However, such laws 
are a mere writing between the lines. In the 2014/5 State of the Nation Address 
(SONA) President Zuma highlighted that  in order  to prevent corruption and promote 
ethical governance, the Public Administration and Management Act (PAMA) 11 of 
2014 (South Africa, 2014) was signed into a law to, among other things, prohibit public 
servants from doing business with the State. According to Australian Health 
Practitioner Regulatory Agency (AHPRA) (2014:18), the meaning of the term “conflict 
of interest” and how it applies to the National Law takes place in the case where the 
interest or business of a person affects that person’s impartiality or their effectiveness 
in their duty. Similarly, Reed (2008: 7) asserts that conflict of interest happens when a 
public official has a private or other interest, which is among others, to influence, or 
appear to influence, impartial and objective performance of the official duties. From 
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the discussion above, conflict of interest happens when a public figure unfairly 
influences decision on the awarding of contracts. If, for example, a director within a 
government department has a final say over who must be awarded a contract while 
the family member is one of the bidders, subjectivity will obviously overcome objectivity 
more particularly if such relationship is not revealed. 
 
Bracking (2007:60) accentuates that there must be clear procedure, guidelines and 
contract requirements and ethical codes of conduct. According to Ambe and 
Badenhorst-Weiss (2012:245), Section 112 of the MFMA No 56 of 2003 (South Africa, 
2003) set out the procurement reform processes, which stipulates, among others, that 
all municipalities must have and implement a SCM policy. The latter should be 
reviewed annually to ensure that it complies with the new legislative requirement and 
Section 76(4) (C) of the PFMA No 1 of 1999 and the PPPFA No 5 of 2000 (South 
Africa, 2000b). All role players, including public officials, should perform their duties in 
such a way that neither they nor their family or friends can expect to receive any illegal 
gains in the form of a reward, payment or hand out from any person, or provider 
contractor for themselves. From the discussion above, it is clear that there is a variety 
of police guides and legislation that outline the manner in which tendering procedures 
should be adhered to. However, for some reasons, people choose to bypass standard 
procedures and guidelines covering tender bidding processes. It has been found in 
Auditor-General’s (AG) 2015 Report (South Africa, 2015a) that the CoT procured 
services and goods without inviting competitive bidders as required by SCM 
regulations. 
 
According to National Treasury’s 2015 Public Sector Supply Chain Review (2015b:3), 
the new Office of the Chief Procurement Officer (OCPO) modifies and supervises the 
SCM system that it utilised in the public sector in South Africa to guarantee that the 
Constitution and related regulations are complied with during procurement in terms of 
costs, fairness, transparency and competition. The OCPO is not directly involved in 
procurement, but leads and manages procurement reform, maintains the procurement 
system and oversees the way in which government does business with the private 
sector.  
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From an investigative point of view, there is a variety of policy guides and legislation 
during investigation of tender irregularities. This must be done by looking for any 
deviation from the procedures, policy and legislative requirements by the either bidders 
and the facilitators of a tender process. The latter office must further supplement all 
other existing policies and laws regarding tender bidding.   
 
2.2.4 Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 
 
The aim of the PRECCA, No.12 of 2004 (South Africa, 2004a) is to make provision for 
the existence of corruption and corrupt activities and to implement measures for the 
prevention and combatting of thereof. The Act is based upon prevention of crimes of 
which people may be criminally charged for embroiling themselves in corrupt activities 
during the stages of tendering process. Section 3 of the Act provides that anyone who 
directly or indirectly accepts, agrees, or offers any gratification from any other person, 
whether for the benefit of himself or herself or for the benefit of another person is guilty 
of corruption.  
 
According to section 34(1) of the Act, in the case where any person in a position as 
set out in section 34(4) of the Act and who is aware of criminal activities can be 
expected to be aware that another person has acted unlawfully (corruption) in terms 
of sections 3 to 16 or 20 to 21 of the Act, or committed theft, fraud, extortion, forgery 
or assisted in forging a document to the amount of R100 000, 00 or more, such person 
is obliged to bring this to the attention to the police or make sure that somebody else 
reports it. In terms of section 34(2) a person who does not inform the police of such 
activity is guilty of an offence. 
 
2.2.5 The Public Finance Management Act 29 of 1999 
 
Mantzaris (2014: 69) explains the PFMA 1 of 1999 (South Africa, 1999) has changed 
procurement practices in government considerably. One of the most important 
changes was that authority and responsibility were moved to individual organisations. 
In order for this to be successful there is a need for a national framework that gives 
the basis for procurement principles that will be instituted to guarantee that policies are 
applied in a uniform way in all spheres of government. 
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The PFMA 1 of 1999 (South Africa, 1999) provides that accounting officers and 
accounting authorities must have adequate systems for the maintenance of financial 
management, procurement, risk, internal control, and internal audit systems are in 
place at their institutions as well as a system to evaluate all major capital projects. The 
supply chain management regulations to be used are set out in the Treasury 
Regulations. The MFMA (South Africa, 2003) have almost the same provisions as the 
PFMA. The only difference being that those of the MFMA is applicable to entities in 
the municipal sphere and not national. Section 112 of the MFMA permits the Minister 
of Finance to issue a prescribed regulatory framework for SCM. There are various 
elements in the public sector SCM system which are provided for in the government’s 
Government Procurement Policy Framework (GPPF). From the above it is apparent 
that there are many pieces of legislation and internal control systems that should be 
used to ensure that tender processes are fair. However, the fact that there are so many 
irregularities during the tender process indicates that the process is not always 
followed in order to advance certain individuals. Tenders must comply with every 
aspects of the invitation to tender and meet any other requirements outlined by the 
procuring entity in its tender documents (Bolton, 2014:1). 
 
Section 217 of the Constitution and Chapter 11 of the MFMA 56 of 2003 (South Africa, 
2003) requires that organs of state at all government levels, or any other institution 
identified in national legislation, enter into contracts for the procurement of goods or 
services, these contracts must be entered into by using a system which is fair, 
equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective. The latter’s SCM policy must 
include the following:  
 
• The variety processes in the SCM system available to municipalities and 
municipal entities, including tenders, quotations, auctions and other types of 
competitive bidding. 
• When a specific process is legislated to be used by these entities. 
• Procedures and mechanisms for each type of process. 
• Procedures and mechanisms for more flexible processes for contracts that do 
not reach prescribed amount. 
• Open and transparent pre-qualification processes for tenders or other bids. 
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• Competitive bidding processes in which only pre-qualified persons may 
participate.  
• Bid documentation, advertising of and invitations for contracts. 
 
During 2015 the SONA, former President Jacob Zuma highlighted that they were in 
the process of establishing a central tender board that will scrutinise all tenders 
throughout government to prevent unlawful action in the supply chain system in 
government. “This body will work with the chief procurement officer whose main 
function will be to check on pricing and adherence to procedures as well as fairness,” 
said the President in his 6th SONA. The AG of South Africa has, in terms of the 
Constitution, jurisdiction over the whole public sector (South Africa, 2014). 
 
2.2.6 The Public Audit Act 25 of 2004  
 
In terms of the Public Audit Act (PAA), No. 25 of 2004 (South Africa, 2004b) the 
Auditor-General must audit and report on the accounts, financial statements and 
financial management of: 
 
• All national and provincial state departments and administrations; 
• All constitutional institutions; 
• The administration of Parliament and of each provincial legislature; 
• All municipalities; 
• All municipal entities; and 
 
Any other institution or accounting entity required by other national or by provincial 
legislation to be audited by the Auditor-General.  
Sections 20(2)(b) and 28(1)(b) of the PAA, the Auditor-General’s report must reflect 
material findings on non-compliance with relevant laws and regulations in respect of 
the following inter alia subject matters, as applicable: 
  
• strategic planning and performance management;  
• budgets;  
• financial statements, performance and annual reports;  
• audit committees;  
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• Internal audit;  
• procurement and contract management;  
• human resource management and compensation;  
• expenditure management;  
• transfer of funds and/or conditional grants;  
• revenue management;  
• asset and liability management; and   
• financial misconduct.  
 
The aforementioned legislations and policy guidelines clarify what to do and what not 
to do by the relevant parties during facilitation of procurement process.  
According to Public Sector Supply Chain Management Review (South Africa, 
2015a:10), the following were regularly found in the Auditor-General’s Annual Reports 
on non-compliance with the SCM and irregular expenditure: 
 
•  The tax affairs of suppliers who were appointed were not always in order 
•  Failure to use competitive processes for quotations and bids. 
•  The preference points system was not always used correctly. 
•  Not enough suitable bid committees. 
•  Suppliers that were not qualified were used. 
•  Bids were overlooked for incorrect reasons. 
•  The wrong processes were used in terms of threshold values when procuring. 
 
For quotations and competitive bidding: 
 
•  Extension of validity periods; 
•  Incorrect use of the limited bidding process; 
•  Inadequate controls and procedures for handling bids; 
•  Appointment of bid committee members not aligned with policy requirements; 
•  Insufficient motivation for deviations from SCM procedures; and 
• Compliance, investigation and irregularities  
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Participants were asked the following question:  Which policies and legislation do you 
use to direct your investigations of tender irregularities, financial misconduct and 
related matters? The purpose of this question was to examine participants’ knowledge 
of the various policy and legislative directives governing tender fraud in procurement. 
A summary of the participants’ responses follows:    
 
• Five participants expressed that tenders are guided by the Constitution of the 
country and Municipal System Act 32 of 2000 as well as Government 
Procurement guided by the NT Republic of South Africa.  
• Two participants indicated PPPFA No. 5 of 2000 provides guidelines on the 
processes and decision to award contract within the CoT.  
• Two participants stated that the MFMA 56 of 2003, Government Gazette No. 
26019 categorically states the whole procedure to be followed when awarding 
contracts within the CoT.  
• Seven participants are of the view that the PRECCA No. 12 of 2004 guard 
against any deviation from the procedures and laws when awarding contracts.  
 
It appears from the participant’s responses that they have basic knowledge about 
policies and laws governing procurement of services and goods. However, the 
investigators must go beyond reproach on the legislation and policies covering 
procurement of services. That would protect them against investigation flaws that 
would render misconduct in bidding process going unpunished. Knowledge of law 
governing public procurement is the fundamental core of the investigation of tender 
irregularities. 
 
The following discussion provides an overview of the types of tender fraud in 
procurement. 
 
2.3 TYPES OF TENDER FRAUD IN PROCUREMENT 
 
The World Bank (2013: 7) explains corruption in procurement usually has its origin in 
a request for, or offer of, payment. After this, followed by collusive tendering and more 
fraud to hide these irregularities: 
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• Demand for payment: When, in order to irregularly be awarded a contract, a 
firm or individual offers a bribe to a government official and such official accepts 
such bribe. Usually, the official who is involved in corruption will allow the other 
party to charge more for supplies to recover the money lost to the bribe. 
• Bid rigging: Government officials interfere with the bidding process to make sure 
that the contract is awarded to the firm which offers the bribe (and which 
charges exorbitant prices to recover the money lost on bribes). 
• Fraud: The corrupt firm to whom the contract was fraudulently awarded charges 
exorbitant prices, sends invoices for work they did not perform, does not meet 
contract specifications or uses products of poor quality to complete the work in 
order to regain the money lost to the bribe. On order to do all this, more illegal 
payments often have to be made to inspectors or auditors. 
 
Heggstad et al. (2010:8) explain that corruption in procurement could occur as follows: 
 
• Bribery is regarded as the type of corruption that is used the most. It can be 
described as the offering of monetary or other reward to gain a benefit. Bribes 
can ensure that other suppliers are used than the best.  
• Extortion can entail harming or threatening someone in exchange for 
something.  
  
Embezzlement is the when a person or firm steals or misuses property or money 
entrusted to someone (usually themselves), but owned by others (usually their 
employer) (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001:8). Nepotism is to favour relatives when granting 
jobs or benefits. Patronage systems: Patronage takes place when local public office 
holders grant favours, jobs and contracts in return for political support. Such systems 
tend to disregard formal rules, and instead give importance to personal channels 
(Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001:16).  
  
Fraud involves some kind of deceit and manipulation or distortion of information, by a 
public officer, with the intention to seek personal gain. In procurement corruption, fraud 
often takes the form of failure to meet contract specifications, or false, inflated or 
duplicated invoices. 
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Participants were asked the following question: Name the types of tender fraud in 
procurement? The purpose of this question was to evaluate participants’ 
understanding of the types of tender fraud in procurement. A summary of the 
participants’ responses follows:    
 
• Six participants indicated that bidders bribing procurement officials in the run-
up to bidding process to influence the awarding of contracts was prevailing. 
• Four participants expressed that procurement officials demanding that bidders 
pay in exchange of contracts was evidenced by luxury lifestyles among 
procurement officials. 
• Two participants believed that forged Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) 
documents included in the tender documents is one of red-flag indicators. 
• Four participants responded that falsified South African Revenue Services 
(SARS) certificates are presented as tax compliance to obtain contracts within 
CoT is common indicator of tender-irregularity. 
 
Feedback provided by the participants indicates that tender procurement fraud is 
normalised to such an extent that it is no longer viewed as misconduct. Narrow 
understanding of types of tender procurement fraud is explained by lack of cooperation 
with other stakeholders such as National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and South 
African Police Service (SAPS) Commercial Crime Unit. The level of understanding 
could be enhanced by participating in workshops often hosted by the Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) across the country. Procurement fraud red flags 
follow for discussion. 
 
2.4 PROCUREMENT FRAUD RED FLAGS  
 
The supply chain process lends itself to fraud being committed. From procurement to 
distribution there are always parts where employees and external parties (such as 
suppliers, distributors and competitors) can perform fraudulent activities, such as 
issuing false invoices, offering and accepting bribes and kickbacks, stealing inventory 
and using substandard goods. Some of the “red flags” to look out for include:  
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• Poor or non-existent record keeping;  
• Higher-price, lower-quality goods;  
• Excessive entertaining of procurement staff by suppliers;  
• Deviations in communications between procurement staff and suppliers, such 
as calls or text messaging to mobile phones;  
• Procurement staff demanding extended periods of notice before they allow an 
audit to take place; and 
• Inexperienced buyers dealing with overbearing suppliers and buyers not taking 
leave for extended periods (Deloitte & Touche, 2014:2). 
 
Mufutau and Mojisola (2016:9) identify the following indicators of procurement fraud: 
 
• When control processes in the purchase department are not applied 
successfully;  
• When new, unknown vendors are used;  
• When employees do not stay in the purchasing department for long;  
• When certain vendors receive more contracts for a reason;  
• When a person(s) working for the company has a relation with a person(s) from 
the vendor (e.g. joint vacation or leisure activities);  
• When a vendor without an apparent competitive advantage or with low-quality 
goods and services are regularly awarded tenders;  
• When there are regular queries and doubts regarding an employee or entity 
with relation to fraud; and  
• When documentation for important purchases are missed often (contracts, bills 
of delivery, price lists). 
 
The World Bank (2013:6) explains a red flag as an indicator of possible fraud or 
corruption.  In all types of public projects there can be a variety of possibilities of fraud 
and corruption. These could be found in irregularities in bidding documents such as 
when bids from different bidders are faxed from the same telephone number. Further 
ref flags for fraud include when more is paid on an invoice. The procurement cycle 
consists of many steps. Therefore, risks of corruption can be found throughout the 
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cycle. Heggstad, et al. (2010:17) summarise the common signs or red flags of 
corruption in different stages of the tendering processes in Figure 2.1 as follows: 
 
Figure 2.1 Common signs or red flags of corruption in different stages of the 
tendering processes 
Unreasonable prequalification requirements Excluding qualified bidders 
Ambiguous, incomplete or misleading contract 
Specifications 
Unbalanced bidding, corruption 
Contract specifications are too narrow or too 
broad 
Rigged   specifications,   excluding   
qualified bidders, corruption 
Tendering red flags Tendering corruption schemes 
Failure to make bidding documents available Excluding qualified bidders, corruption 
Short or inadequate notice to bidders Excluding qualified bidders, corruption 
Unusual bidding patterns 
 
 
Collusive bidding 
Apparent connections between bidders Collusive bidding 
Bidder not listed in business or telephone 
directories 
Collusive bidding 
Multiple contract awards to the same company Corruption 
Qualified companies fail to bid Excluding qualified bidders, collusive 
bidding 
Rotation of winning bidders Collusive bidding 
Unreasonably high bids Collusive bidding 
Unreasonably low bids Unbalanced bidding, corruption 
Non‐transparent bid‐opening procedures Manipulation  of  bids,  excluding  
qualified bidders 
bidders, corruption 
Award to other than the lowest qualified bidder Manipulation of bids, corruption 
Disqualifications that are poorly supported Excluding qualified bidders, corruption 
Pressure to select a certain contractor 
subcontractor 
or agent 
Corruption 
Winning bid is very close to budget or estimate Unbalanced bidding, corruption 
Long unexplained delays in contract award or 
Negotiations 
Manipulation of bids, corruption 
Post‐award red flags Post‐award schemes 
Use of questionable agents or subcontractors Corruption 
Complaints regarding poor quality goods, works 
or Services 
Failure to meet contract specification 
Continued acceptance of poor quality goods,  
works or services 
Corruption 
Delivery of poor quality goods, works or 
services 
Failure to meet contract specification 
Questionable contract amendments (change 
orders) 
Changes   in   contract   to   increase   
price, Corruption 
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Participants were asked the following question: According to you, what are the 
common red flags of fraud in the different stages of the tendering processes? The 
purpose of this question was to ascertain the participants’ knowledge of the typical red 
flags of corruption in the different stages of the tendering processes.  
A summary of the participants’ responses follows:    
 
• Six participants indicated that procurement officials living beyond their salaries 
raised suspicion during investigation of tender irregularities. 
• Four participants were concerned that suspected internal officials are never 
absent from work throughout the year. 
• Two participants indicated that incompetent service providers are awarded 
contracts followed by unhappy recipients of the service. 
• Two participants expressed that poor workmanship in exchange of a huge 
highly priced contract became one of the common red-flags. 
• Two participants are of the impression that increased community protests 
against poor service delivery is obvious indicator of procurement misconduct. 
 
Participant’s responses indicate that they are not sufficiently knowledgeable about 
lifestyle audit methods, which may help indications of red flags against suspects 
involved in irregular tender procurement processes. It was also learnt that investigators 
marginalise their investigation by not paying enough attention to the corrupted and 
corruptee during an investigation. 
 
The following discussion provides an overview of investigative methods to detect 
tender irregularities and non-compliance procedures. 
 
Questionable invoices False    inflated    or    duplicated    
invoices, Corruption 
Payment of unjustified high prices False    inflated    or    duplicated    
invoices, Corruption 
Absent or questionable documentation False inflated or duplicated invoices 
Red flags of corruption Re ated corruption schemes 
Pre‐tendering red flags Pre‐tendering corruption schemes 
Purchase of unnecessary or inappropriate 
items 
Corruption 
Manipulation of procurement thresholds to 
avoid  prior review 
Unjustified no‐bid awards 
Inadequate evaluation criteria or procedures Manipulation  of  bids,  Excluding  
qualified  bidders, corruption 
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2.5 INVESTIGATIVE METHODS TO DETECT TENDER IRREGULARITIES AND 
NON-COMPLIANCE 
 
Fraud investigations differ from normal police investigations because it usually starts 
with only a suspicion that fraudulent activity is present without any direct evidence. 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) (2008:28). Organisations in the public sector are 
open to various kinds of fraud and corruption in almost all areas of activity and 
transaction.  
 
Notwithstanding, it appears that in numerous nations, particularly developing 
countries, corruption is found in the domain of procurement more than any place else. 
This is on the grounds that this is the environment where there are the most chances 
to take part in corrupt activities and where the rewards can be the highest; therefore, 
various kinds of corrupt activities occur in procurement, such as fraud, bribery, 
collusion, extortion, etc. (Mantzaris, 2014:67). It is therefore important to efficiently 
apply investigative methods in the investigation of tender irregularities and non-
compliance. Public procurement is the function whereby public sector organisations 
acquire goods, services and development and construction projects from suppliers in 
the local and international market, subject to the general principles of fairness, 
equitability, transparency, competitiveness and cost-effectiveness (Ambe & 
Badenhorst-Weiss, 2012:244).  
 
Public officials are government’s contact point with the public and when they illegally 
spend money and other resources that the public desperately needs, they are 
depriving members of the public of essential services (Solidarity, 2015:11). Davia 
(2000:34–35) asserts that fraud detection and the investigation thereof, are concepts 
that are linked together. The first stage is the detection of fraud and the reaction 
thereon is the investigation and is therefore very important to be done. Bologna and 
Shaw (1997:1) explain that in a company there are two categories of fraud: internal 
fraud is when fraud is committed by employees, directors, etc.) and external fraud is 
when fraud is committed by contractors, suppliers, service providers, etc.). 
Investigators must know which of these two types they are looking for in order to find 
the evidence as this could be very easy to miss as it usually consists of a few small 
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pieces of evidence that have to be put together and checked in order to bring the case 
to court (Davia, Coggins, Wideman & Kastantin, 2000:60).  
 
Baily, Farmer, Jessop and Jones (2005:12) explain forms of corruption that seem to 
be present in the tender process. These include manipulating the tender processes to 
sway the scale in favour of a specific project, giving inside information to a particular 
bidder that other bidders do not have, where bidders do not receive the same 
information possibly due to a procurement official altering some bidders’ information. 
Information brokers can also try to buy information from officials in the purchasing or 
decision-making parts of the deals to sell this information to competing bidders. Woods 
and Mantzaris (2012:131) highlight that other forms of bid rigging include the following: 
 
• Collusive bidding (when bidders agree amongst themselves beforehand as to 
who should win the tender, with some secret agreement that the other bidders 
will be compensated in some way, sometimes out of the inflated profits of the 
winning bidder, or by taking turns to win tenders); and  
• Improperly awarded tenders (including the wide-ranging possibilities that exist 
for corruption during the tender evaluation and decision-making phases).  
 
The experience is that the individual(s) who present(s) the information from the 
evaluators to the decision-makers are often in a unique and strong position to influence 
the decision taken. 
 
In cases of corporate fraud and corruption within the CoT, allegations of fraud, theft 
and corruption are often received by the SAPS, through tip offs via the hotline, account 
reconciliation, surveillance, information technology controls, the Public Protector (PP) 
and or the Public Service Commission. In some cases, accounting discrepancies are 
detected by vetting officers who will start an investigation process Bologna and Shaw 
(1997:2). It is important to pinpoint the motive for the fraud in order to find the 
perpetrator because, according to various authors, such as Robertson (2000:193) as 
well as Silverstone and Sheetz (2007:18), the motive is the main reason why criminal 
misconduct such as fraud takes place. The presence of any red flags will indicate the 
possible motive of the offender.  
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Man-wai ([s.a]: 143) identifies the following essential fraud investigation techniques 
and skills:  
 
• ability to identify and trace persons, companies and properties;  
• interview technique;  
• document examination;  
• financial investigation;  
• conducting a search and arrest operations;  
• physical and technical surveillance;  
• acting as undercover agent;  
• handling informers;  
• conducting an entrapment operation; and  
• witness protection.  
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2012: 21 and 
24) similarly identifies the following fraud investigative techniques: interviewing of 
witnesses; searches of suspects’ premises; covert operations, informants; interception 
of communications; and electronic surveillance. The OECD (2012: 23) is further of the 
view that basic investigative techniques, such as interviews and searches, remain the 
best way to investigate fraud. As a result, forensic interviewing as well as search and 
seizure of computer and other digital-related evidence follows for discussion.  
 
2.5.1 Forensic interviewing as method to investigate tender irregularities and 
non-compliance  
 
During the investigation of tender-related criminal misconduct, a variety of people 
could be suspects or witnesses. The investigator needs to embrace a variety of 
methods to deal with all types of evidence, ranging from physical to oral-evidence in 
order to outline a sound and logical sequence of events at the end of an investigation. 
One method to utilise in the investigation of tender-related misconduct is forensic 
interviewing. Therefore, the investigator must have comprehensive forensic 
interviewing skills. Palmiotto (2013:53) underscores that the interviewing process 
needs preparation, acquaintance with the case, knowledge of the subject, knowledge 
of oneself, a proper location, and sufficient time. According to Inbau, Reid, Buckley, 
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and Jayne (2015:19), the psychological factor that contributes to the success of an 
interview is privacy, being alone with the subject for interview during questioning. 
Investigators much refresh their memories by re-visiting the crime scene, viewing the 
crime scene photos, and review the whole investigation file to acquaint themselves 
with the details of the case (Osterburg & Ward, 2010:249). “There is no substitute for 
private location for getting an interview off on the right foot” (Napier, 2010:126). 
 
In order to determine a suspect’s alibi, what the witness has seen, or has heard, the 
interviewer must elicit such information by asking an initial open-ended question early 
during the interview Inbau et al. (2015:50). Napier (2010: 127) argues that a well-
planned, steady pace allows avoiding mistakes that occur when an interview is hurried. 
According to Osterburg and Ward (2010:119), people accumulate the second 
knowledge during their day-to-day involving close relationships as well as informal 
relationships, and when they hear others’ remark or arguments. 
 
Participants were asked the following question: Do you utilise interviewing as method 
to investigate tender irregularities and non-compliance? If not, what are the inhibiting 
factors for not utilising this method? If affirmative, is this method successful?   The 
purpose of this question was to determine if participants utilise interviewing as method 
to investigate tender irregularities and non-compliance. In summary, the participants 
responded as follows to this question:  
   
• Six participants agreed that interviewing is a crucial part of investigation as it 
provides for the opportunity for the provision of first-hand information by the 
parties directly or indirectly involved in the misconduct. 
• Four participants believed that interviewing has many times led to confessions 
by suspects and successful prosecution against them.  
• Six participants responded that interviewing feedback often times corroborate 
other digital evidence collected during the initial investigation of tender-
irregularities. 
 
Feedback from the participants shows that interviewing plays a significant role and 
mostly successful as it leads to where physical evidence linking suspects with 
misconduct is located. One of the factors is that witnesses do not want to participate 
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in forensic interviewing for the fear of reprisal by the suspects concerned. Although 
successful, their interviewing techniques are compromised by the lack of continuous 
training and workshops to sharpen their interviewing methods. 
 
2.5.2  Search and seizure of computer and other digital-related evidence in the 
investigation of tender irregularities and non-compliance 
 
Although traditional investigation procedures are standardised and often successful, 
an investigation should be tailored according to circumstances of the case involved. 
Public officials, including municipal employees, are issued with electronic equipment, 
such as personal computers, laptops, and cell phones to carry out their daily functions. 
This equipment is usually used during the commission of tender-related misconduct 
generating a considerable amount of evidence. In addition, evidence of fraud and 
corruption is found in documents, either electronic and or hard copies. Therefore, it is 
vital that the investigator should be acquainted with relevant law and procedures of 
collection and analysing documentary and digital-related evidence. During 
investigation of tender irregularities and non-compliance, evidence is generated by 
perpetrators by means of computers and other digital equipment. The investigation of 
tender irregularities and non-compliance is usually centred around electronic 
equipment, such as computers, laptops, cell phones and witnesses. According to a 
PWC (2008: 36), in the world of business paper trails are mainly kept on personal 
computers or other electronic devices and no longer on paper and therefore a new 
field of work has come into being, namely computer forensics. Computer forensics 
takes place when the investigator confiscates and analyses data on electronic devices. 
If this is done in the correct manner, it will be admissible as evidence in a court of law. 
Computer forensics is a very important part of modern fraud investigation. 
 
Britz (2013: 306) explains that during the application of a search warrant, operating 
systems, storage devices, and hardware specifications should be featured in the 
application. Similarly, Solomon, Rudolph, Tittel, Broom and Barret (2011:63) assert 
that prior to the collection of any evidence, it is imperative to ensure one has the right 
to search or seize evidence in question.  The right to privacy is enshrined in Chapter 
2, Section 35 of the Constitution. For that reason, in certain circumstances, 
investigators use the limitation clause in section 36 of the Constitution to limit certain 
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rights. For example, if it is suspected that a suspect used a cell phone and personal 
computer to facilitate the tender irregularity or non-compliance, the investigator, with 
the assistance of the prosecutor, could approach the court to obtain a search warrant.  
 
According to the Office of Justice Programs (2008: vi) the following general forensic 
principles should be applied when dealing with digital evidence: 
 
• When evidence of a digital nature is obtained, safeguarded and moved, such 
evidence should not be altered; 
• No person who have not received training in the investigation of digital evidence 
should do such investigation; and 
• All actions taken while confiscating, moving and safe keeping evidence of a 
digital nature should be recorded fully, conserved and available for review. 
 
Participants were asked the following question: According to you, what general 
investigative principles should be followed when dealing with computer and other 
digital-related evidence in the investigation of tender irregularities? The purpose of this 
question was to determine participants’ familiarity with the general principles that 
should be followed to search and seize computer and other digital-related evidence in 
the investigation of tender irregularities and non-compliance. In summary, the 
participants responded as follows to this question: 
 
• Six participants expressed that before any computer and other digital-related 
evidence is seized for further investigation, it must be photographed the way it 
was discovered. 
• Seven participants stressed that computer generated evidence is 
hypersensitive and once destroyed, it can never be recovered. Therefore, 
computer experts should be involved in search and seizure of digital evidence. 
• Three participants emphasised that most of evidence is recovered from hard-
drives and external storages such as Universal Serial Bus (USB) and external 
hard-drives and servers may help in recovering deleted information. 
 
Based on the feedback above, it is clear that participants are not sufficiently acquainted 
with the ever-changing field of digital technology, which often explains why digital 
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evidence was lost if not destroyed. Feedback further indicates a lack of involvement of 
cyber forensic expert in more complex cases where there is more digital evidence 
involved.  
 
2.5.3 Preservation and collection tools for digital evidence during the 
investigation of tender irregularities 
 
Defence lawyers often scrutinise the manner in which evidence was handled and 
usually attempt to expose shortcomings of the investigators during the collection of 
evidence. It is imperative that integrity of evidence collected from computers and other 
equipment is handled with utmost care until the case is disposed of in court or 
disciplinary hearing. Digital evidence is so sensitive that it is important that its collection 
by forensic tools is completely verifiable and remain the same as the original source 
(Goel, 2010:124). Bolt (2011:61) asserts that when preserving computer hard drives, 
the necessary steps should be taken to lessen the chances of damage to the hard 
drive, and a main aspect is to ensure that the collection and preservation process is 
well documented and repeatable. In addition, multiple-boot disks are employed to 
avoid self-destruction programs used by suspects to minimise changes to the 
suspected hard drive (i.e. during the routine boot process, disk space is re-assigned 
and file slack may be overwritten (Britz, 2013:312). The forensic software must have 
the ability to acquire digital evidence or data files by reading that information from a 
variety of media types and formats (Girard, 2011: 407). Girard further maintains that 
Access Data’s Forensic Toolkit can read hard drives, Compact Disk’s (CD), Digital 
Versatile Disk’s (DVD), USBs and cell phone memory, as well as variety of other media 
types. In the same vein, McMahon (2014:172) concurs with the argument stating that 
the key to successful recovery of digital evidence is to gain access to or preserve the 
integrity of the target media as quickly as possible. Furthermore, target media does 
not only include personal computer hard drives, but other types of storage media 
including tape backups, archives, floppy diskettes, Personal Digital Assistants (PDA), 
like palms, and other removable storage. 
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2.5.4 Examination of digital evidence by the forensic investigators 
 
According to Kamble and Jain (2015:159), it is better to conduct an examination of 
digital evidence on a copy of the original evidence. Mendell (2013:67) underscores 
that an expert can obtain the following information for the investigator: 
 
• identification of the files and keywords on the hard drive; 
• revealing the contents of the internet files; 
• locating images; 
• finding deleted files and their contents; 
• locating fragments of data remaining on the hard drive or “slack space”; 
• examining the contents of virtual memory, a rich source of information about 
the recent data created and transacted on the PC, also known as “swap file”; 
• Opening files protected by passwords and encryption; and examining e-mails.  
At the analysis stage, the investigator normally recovers evidential material 
using a variety of methodologies (Kamble & Jain, 2015: 159). Girard (2011: 407) 
suggests that data found in the hard drive relating to access areas of the disk, 
like unallocated space on a disk, which is space that is not currently used to 
store active data, but may have previously stored a file, and slack space, which 
is remnant area at the end of a file must be analysed. According to Marcella and 
Menendez (2008: 49), the speed at which new technology takes to the market, 
and subsequently can be open to abuse or misuse for ill gain makes it difficult 
for cyber forensic investigators to keep abreast with or even ahead of the 
criminals. Solomon et al. (2011:137) reinforce there is a common believe that 
when one deletes information from an electronic device such as a computer, all 
the related information in that file is also deleted. However, this is not true as 
there is a tool that can extract such deleted files from the hard drive (Davory 
data recovery utility). This is supported by McMahon (2014: 169) who outlines 
that when a computer user deletes a file, the operating systems only deletes 
the first letter of the file name from the file allocation table, and reports the 
sectors containing the “deleted” data as “empty” or available for the new storage 
of new data. The latter goes on to say that the old (deleted) data remain 
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unchanged until new data are saved in the specific sector and cluster where the 
residual data sit at this time. 
 
Participants were asked the following question: In your opinion, what are the 
procedures to follow during the search and seizure of computer and other digital-
related evidence in the investigation of tender irregularities? The purpose of this 
question was to determine participants’ familiarity with the required procedures to 
search and seize computer and other digital-related evidence in the investigation of 
tender irregularities and non-compliance.  
 
In summary, the participants responded as follows to this question: 
    
• Eight participants emphasised that investigators who received cyber forensic 
training must play a leading role since they know sensitivity of digital evidence 
and they know how to recover and process it. 
• Two participants indicated that recovered evidence must be copied for back up 
purpose in case the original evidence is lost.  
• Three participants stressed that official laptops and cell phones must be seized 
from the suspected officials and placed in evidence bags for processing in 
digital evidence lab. 
• One participant is of the view that network service providers must be utilised in 
the recovery of cell phone and other communication records for analysis by the 
investigators.  
• One participant believes that if cell phones are part of evidence during any stage 
of the investigation, they must never be switched off, and the battery power 
should be retained as some evidence might be lost in case of power loss.  
• One participant stated that digital technology is constantly changing therefore 
investigators must receive constant and continuous training in cyber forensic 
for the interest of integrity of computer and digital evidence.  
 
It is evident that investigators need to undergo extensive and continuous training to be 
able to perform their duties without any hinder.  
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2.5.5  Report on digital evidence after forensic investigation 
 
When an investigation is complete, the information should be reported in non-technical 
language (Kamble & Jain, 2015: 159). According to McMahon (2014: 165) a summary 
of the fraudulent incident, a description of the evidence that constitutes the crime, a 
description of the way in which the crime was perpetrated, the motive of the suspected 
perpetrator, the financial impact of the fraud, and the review of the evidence identifying 
those responsible should all be included in the research report. Gbegi (2014: 71) 
believes that prior to writing an investigative report the investigator should compile all 
data gathered during investigations, and review it to determine how the report must 
organised. An investigative report must include as much significant detail as possible 
to accurately document the actions of the investigator without burden (Silverstone & 
Sweetz, 2007:265). From an investigative point of view in South Africa, the cyber 
forensic expert must complete a statement in terms of Section 212 of Criminal 
Procedures Act 51 of 1977 (South Africa, 1977). The latter must report on the activities 
taken, from the collection to processing of digital evidence as well as chain of custody 
in handling the digital evidence. 
  
2.6 SUMMARY 
 
Tender irregularities arise when policies, relevant legislations and the supreme law of 
the country in the form of constitution are contravened. Procurement of goods and 
services is common at all government departments in order to dish out improved 
service delivery. However, procurement is a long chain, which unscrupulous 
contractors and final decision makers within the governments explore weakest link to 
steal from taxpayers’ money through corrupt activities. This chapter looked into how 
the policies and legislation outline the procurement process in a fair and transparent 
manner for justified benefits of stakeholders. It is the violation of the policies and laws 
that display that irregularly. This chapter further covered the relevant legal provisions 
and internal policies within municipality to the supply chain.  
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CHAPTER 3: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This study examined the investigation of tender irregularities within the CoT. The study 
described non-compliance and tender irregularities to determine if investigators at the 
CoT efficiently investigate the non-compliance of tender procedures by service 
providers to reduce tender irregularities. This chapter summarises Chapter 1 and 
Chapter 2 of the dissertation, after which the recommendations are presented based 
on the findings discussed in Chapter 2.  
3.2 SUMMARY 
 
Chapter 1 presented a general orientation of the study. The chapter started with the 
identification and confirmation of the identified research problem. Arising from the 
identified research problem, the aim, purpose and research question of this study were 
presented.  
 
The following aim of this study was achieved: 
 
• To examine the investigation of tender irregularities within the CoT.  
 
The following purpose of this study was achieved:  
 
• The investigation procedures in tender irregularities within the CoT were 
explored and described. 
• The non-compliance of tender processes within the CoT were underlined and 
the financial implications thereof highlighted. 
• To determine the extent to which the prescribed compliance procedures are 
applied during tender bidding. 
 
Subsequently, the following primary research question was adequately addressed: 
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• Do investigators efficiently investigate the non-compliance of tender procedures 
by service providers to reduce tender irregularities within the CoT? 
 
The identified study population and sample for this study were indicated and their 
inclusion motivated, followed by an overview of the research methodology utilised in 
this study. This chapter concluded with a summary of the factors taken into 
consideration to ensure trustworthiness and the ethical considerations of the study. 
 
Chapter 2 provided an overview of tender irregularities and the investigation of non-
compliance. The chapter commenced with an overview of the legislative and 
regulatory framework governing tender procedures within the CoT. The chapter then 
presented a discussion of the types of tender fraud in procurement, procurement fraud 
red flags, and investigative methods to detect tender irregularities and non-
compliance. The findings consequential to the semi-structured interviews were 
presented and integrated into a discussion of the relevant literature on tender 
irregularities. 
3.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The findings of this study, as illustrated in Chapter 2, call for recommendations on how 
investigators could more efficiently investigate the non-compliance of tender 
procedures by service providers to reduce tender irregularities within the CoT. These 
recommendations are focused on the responses received from participants, and are 
concentrated on the investigation of tender irregularities within the CoT.  
 
The recommendations are presented below: 
• Investigators must acquaint themselves with existing laws and newly 
promulgated law dealing with fraud and corruption in tender bidding and 
awarding processes. Procedural technicalities are some of the reasons why 
cases are lost in court. Therefore, investigators must read extensively on 
criminal procedures act, law of evidence as well as a thorough study of the 
constitution. 
• Cases should be thoroughly investigated before a decision to institute litigations 
against non-compliance and tender irregularities is taken. Despite the higher 
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volumes of cases reported for non-compliance and irregularities in the awarding 
of tenders, there is no sufficient literature covering the topic, therefore the 
researcher recommends further research. 
• Persons involved in tender related investigations must be subjected to security 
vetting on a regular basis as by the virtue of the job, they have potential to be 
corrupted. It is further recommended that investigation dockets be thoroughly 
secured and accounted for at all times. Investigators must be in touch with new 
developments on training models designed to fight fraud and corruption within 
government departments. The CoT must maintain its own in-house training 
facility that will also accommodate forensic investigators.  
• An investigation into tender irregularities involves more of documentary 
evidence, including prints and electronic versions. The investigators must 
strictly maintain the integrity of such evidence’s authenticity as well as 
maintaining a chain of possession. For successful investigation and prosecution 
of non-compliance and tender irregularities, it is recommended that 
investigators observe their professional code of ethics to sustain personal 
integrity. 
• For policy purposes, the researcher recommends that the shortlisted bidders be 
subjected to security vetting prior to the awarding of contracts to minimize 
incidents of tender irregularities and non-compliance in tender contracts. 
• Investigators must be encouraged to join fraud and corruption fighting 
organisations such as Corruption Watch and the ACFE as they have 
programmes that inform members about in-depth meaning of corruptions and 
fraud as well as detailed symptoms of fraud and corruption and new modus 
operandi used by perpetrators.  
• GAR within the CoT should establish its own internal academy with the 
curriculum designed to fight irregularities during the awarding of contracts. 
Investigators should update themselves with amended sections in the relevant 
legislations. 
• Comprehensive understanding and regular acquaintance with the PFMA, Act 1 
of 1999 and the PPPFA are the pivotal core of an investigation of tender 
irregularities, as it channels an investigation in a right direction. Investigators 
must have a thorough understanding of all laws governing fraud and corruption-
related incidents. That would be achieved by continued and compulsory training 
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for the investigators. Investigators must further empower themselves at 
institutions of higher learning to comprehend the skills and experience they 
already accumulated. 
3.4  CONCLUSION  
 
This study examined compliance procedures in the investigation of tender irregularities 
within the CoT. The reviewed literature presents the importance of the sufficient 
investigation of non-compliance of tender procedures. However, the results of the 
interviews conducted propose that investigators at the CoT GAR experience 
shortcomings with regard to efficiently investigate the non-compliance of tender 
procedures by service providers to reduce tender irregularities within the CoT. 
Therefore, the research question, namely, Do investigators efficiently investigate the 
non-compliance of tender procedures by service providers to reduce tender 
irregularities within the CoT? was adequately addressed. 
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ADDENDUM A: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
 
1. According to you, what procedures should be followed to procure goods and 
services as stated in the COT Supply chain management policy, according to 
the value of the services or goods? 
2. According to which policies and legislation do you direct your investigation of 
tender irregularities, financial misconduct and related matters? 
3. Name the type of tender fraud in procurement? 
4. According to you, what are the common red-flags of fraud in different stages of 
tendering process? 
5. Do you utilise interviewing as a method to investigate tender irregularities and 
non-compliance? If not, what are the inhibiting factors for not utilising this 
method, if affirmative, is this method successful? 
6. What general principles should be followed to search and seize computer and 
other digital-related evidence in the investigation of tender irregularities and non-
compliance? Please motivate your answer? 
7. According to you, what general principles should be followed when dealing with 
computer and other digital-related evidence in the investigation of tender 
irregularities? Please motivate your answer? 
8. In your own opinion, what are the procedures to follow during the search and 
seizure of computer other digital-related evidence in the investigation of tender 
irregularities? Please motivate your answer?  
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ADDENDUM B: UNISA ETHICS APPROVAL 
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ADDENDUM C: CITY OF TSHWANE LETTER OF APPROVAL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  57 
 
 
 
  58 
ADDENDUM D: CONFIRMATION OF LANGUAGE EDITING 
 
 
 
